Caveat Emptor’s Current Role in Louisiana and Islamic Law: Worlds Apart yet Surprisingly Close by Borroni, Andrea & Tabor, Charles
Journal of Civil Law Studies
Volume 2 | Number 1 Article 4
1-1-2009
Caveat Emptor’s Current Role in Louisiana and
Islamic Law: Worlds Apart yet Surprisingly Close
Andrea Borroni
Charles Tabor
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Andrea Borroni and Charles Tabor, Caveat Emptor’s Current Role in Louisiana and Islamic Law: Worlds Apart yet Surprisingly Close, 2 J.
Civ. L. Stud. (2009)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol2/iss1/4
  
CAVEAT EMPTOR’S CURRENT ROLE IN 
LOUISIANA AND ISLAMIC LAW:  
WORLDS APART YET SURPRISINGLY CLOSE  
Andrea Borroni∗ & Charles Tabor†∗ 
 
Abstract ..........................................................................................61 
 
I. Introduction ................................................................................62 
 
II. Sources and Application of Law ...............................................65 
 
III. Good Faith, Contracts, and a Duty to Disclose - Maybe .........69 
A. Good Faith.............................................................................71 
B. A Duty of Disclosure and a Common Idea of Defects ..........73 
 
IV. The Vices of Consent...............................................................82 
A. The Louisiana Perspective ....................................................82 
B. The Islamic Perspective ........................................................91 
 
V. Conclusion ................................................................................98 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Caveat emptor is one of the most well known maxims of the 
legal world.  Interpreters from different countries have their own 
understanding of this doctrine.  At first glance, Louisiana law and 
Islamic law have nothing in common. Louisiana, at least 
superficially, adheres to the great civil law tradition that the 
legislature is supreme.  Its primary sources of law are legislation 
and custom.  Islamic law is divine in origin, a direct manifestation 
                                                                                                             
∗
 Researcher of Private Comparative Law, and Professor of Chinese Law 
and Far Eastern Countries, Seconda University of Naples (Italy); Laurea 
(University of Pavia 2000); LL.M. (Louisiana State University Law Center 
2006); Doctorate in Comparative law (University of Trento 2006). 
†
 Practicing attorney with the law firm of Sher, Garner, Cahill, Richter, 
Klein & Hilbert, LLC (New Orleans); J.D. (Louisiana State University Law 
Center 2008).  
62                JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES              [Vol. 2 
 
of Allah’s will.  Its primary sources of law are the Koran and the 
wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad.  Yet, in practice, these two 
systems have developed surprisingly similar approaches toward 
duties of disclosure and the doctrine of caveat emptor.  The 
similarities between the above mentioned legal systems’ approach 
to caveat emptor and duties of disclosure are uncanny.  Regardless 
of whether the issue is dealt under the heading of mistake, 
misrepresentation, or error and fraud, there is a commonality of 
approach that cannot be missed.  Despite this obvious diversity of 
methods, traditions and styles, it is possible to notice an element, 
or better, a tendency common to the examined regulations, that 
may be found more in operational rules than in principle 
statements. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Looks can be deceiving.  At first glance, Louisiana law and 
Islamic law have nothing in common.  Louisiana, at least 
superficially, adheres to the great civil law tradition that the 
legislature is supreme.  Its primary sources of law are legislation 
and custom.  Islamic law is divine in origin, a direct manifestation 
of Allah’s will.  Its primary sources of law are the Koran and the 
wisdom of the Prophet Muhammad.  Yet, in practice, these two 
systems have developed surprisingly similar approaches toward 
duties of disclosure and the doctrine of caveat emptor.  
Caveat emptor means literally “let the buyer beware.”        
Although stated in the language of the great Roman Empire, the 
phrase caveat emptor is not a product of Roman Law.1  In fact, it 
                                                                                                             
1. It should be noted, however, that Roman law originally contained a rule 
similar to caveat emptor.  See A. ARTHER SCHILLER, ROMAN LAW: 
MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT 22 (Mouton 1978).  Yet the Roman law 
eventually moved towards a warranty based system to protect purchasers.  In 
contracts of purchase and sale (emptio venditio) the seller (venditor) is in breach 
if the thing sold (res vendita) is defective.  The edict of the aediles curules, the 
Roman officials or magistrates charged with the supervision of public markets, 
introduced a warranty against latent defects with a view to protecting the 
interests of the purchaser (emptor) who could not be expected to be aware of 
such defects.  In terms of this aedilitian edict, the seller was liable for any defect 
that wholly or substantially impaired the utility or effectiveness of the thing 
sold.  The purchaser could claim full restitution by means of the actio 
redhibitoria or a diminution of the purchase price by means of the actio quanti 
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was the common law of England that gave birth to this often used, 
yet widely criticized, Latin phrase.  First appearing in legal use 
around the end of the 16th century,2 the maxim eventually came to 
                                                                                                             
 
minoris.  In later Roman law, the actio empti (the action arising from the 
purchase) could be used instead of the aedilitian actions. 
Specifically, during the Roman Republic, these magistrates in their edicts, 
made rules about the sale of slaves or beasts of burden in the public markets that 
required the seller to disclose any illness or defect (be it a physical defect or a 
character defect).  Also, in regard to slaves, the seller had to disclose if the slave 
was a wanderer, fugitive, or suspected of some crime or delict for which his 
master might be liable. 
The actio redhibitoria (to be brought within six months of the contract of 
sale) foresaw the restitutio in integrum, returning the object to the seller and 
receiving back the price.  While the actio quanti minoris (to be brought within 
one year of the contract of sale) sought a decrease in the purchase price, 
retaining the object of sale but obtaining the return of part of the price to reflect 
the decrease in value of the object.  The seller was liable whether or not he knew 
of the defect and also if he had made claims that were not true (i.e. that the 
object of the sale was free from particular defects or possessed particular 
qualities). 
Under Justinian, these actions were available generally for all objects of 
sale, whether or not the item was sold in a public market.  Moreover, the actio 
empti could be used to achieve the same result of these actions, making them 
superfluous though they still existed. 
The first application of the aedilitian remedies is based upon the general 
principle that the seller is under a duty to disclose, and assume liability for, all 
latent defects which make the thing sold unfit for its intended purpose.  F. DE 
ZULUETA, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 50 (1957).  For an account of the evolution 
and operation of this edict in Roman Law and its role in modern Roman Dutch 
Law, see A.M. Honoré, The History of the Aedilitian Actions from Roman to 
Roman Dutch Law, in D. DAUBE, STUDIES IN THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 132-159 
(1959).  A full discussion of Roman law is, however, beyond the scope of this 
article. 
2. W.H. Hamilton,  The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L. J. 1133 
(1931); A.M. Musy, Disclosure of Information in the Pre-Contractual 
Bargaining: A Comparative Analysis, 1 CARDOZO ELECTRONIC LAW BULLETIN 
16, 4 (1995), http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Contract/Musy-
1995/musy1.htm (last visited September 20, 2009); A. PROTON, FROM CAVEAT 
EMPTOR TO CAVEAT VENDITOR IN SALES OF DEFECTIVE HOMES: TOWARD A 
CONSENSUS BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND COMMON LAW TRADITIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES? 13, 15 (1992).  Caveat emptor first appeared in print in a discussion 
involving horse trading. Hamilton, supra at 1164.  It was written that, “If [the 
horse] be tame enough and have been rydden upon, then caveat emptor,” and 
referring to situations where a horse was sold with no warranty, then such a sale 
was said to be “at the other’s peril, for his eyes and his taste ought to be his 
judges.” Id.  Apparently, around the same time, a Lancaster ordinance, while not 
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dominate English policy on the seller’s duty of disclosure. That 
dominance can be said to have begun in the case of Chandler v. 
Lopus in 1603.3 
In Chandler, a goldsmith sold a purported bezoar stone4 to 
an uninformed buyer.5  The buyer later discovered that the stone 
was not, in fact, a real bezoar.6  The purchaser brought an action in 
trespass in the case7 to recover the value he had paid for the stone.8  
The court held that “the bare affirmatio n that it was a bezar-
stone[sic], without warranting it to be so, is no cause of action.”9  
The court further stated that it was immaterial that the goldsmith 
knew that the stone was not a bezoar because so long as he does 
not warrant such a quality, a buyer does not have cause of action.10  
Chandler is an example of caveat emptor in its purest form.  A 
seller has no duty to disclose defects in the item he is selling (even 
if he knows of the defect); while the buyer has a right to inspect the 
item he is purchasing to ensure it is free from any defect.  In effect, 
it is a policy choice on the burden of inspection.  The buyer has the 
burden of making sure he is getting what he wants.  If the buyer 
fails to fully inform himself about the item he is purchasing, it is 
his own fault if he gets something other than what he intended.  
While caveat emptor once reigned supreme in the Western legal 
                                                                                                             
 
employing the word caveat emptor, dealt with malt purchases by stating, “let 
their eye be their champion.” Id.  
3. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1166.  This, however, was not the first case to 
deal with the issue of caveat emptor.  In fact, two years earlier it was argued in 
Moore v. Hussey that a law quoted incorrectly as “Caveat emptor, qui ignorari 
non debuit quod alienum jus emit” applied in a case dealing with the law of 
estates and the value of a marriage; the judge dismissed the claim as irrelevant. 
Id. at 1165. 
4. A bezoar stone is any “various calculi found chiefly in the gastro-
intestinal organs and formerly believed to possess magical properties.”  
MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com  
(last visited September 20, 2009).  
5. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603). 
6. Id. 
7. “At common law, an action to recover damages that are not the 
immediate result of a wrongful act but rather a later consequence.  This action 
was the precursor to a variety of modern-day tort claims, including negligence, 
nuisance, and business torts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (8th ed. 2004).  
8. Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (1603). 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
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tradition, changing notions of fairness have softened its effect.  
Modern legal institutions, which include items such as implied 
warranties and pre-contractual duties of disclosure, have shifted 
much of the buyer’s duty back onto the seller.  Thus, caveat 
emptor is largely an echo of an age past. 
The purpose of this article is two-fold.  Firstly, it seeks to give 
an accurate depiction of the approach toward pre-contractual duties 
of disclosure in two legal systems, the Islamic law and Louisiana 
Law.  Secondly, it attempts to juxtapose these two systems so as to 
highlight their similarities and differences.  Overall, the authors 
hope to use this comparison to show that the rule of law has 
evolved in surprisingly similar ways through two drastically 
different legal systems. 
 
II. SOURCES AND APPLICATION OF LAW 
 
 Islamic law is generally called Shari'a, which refers to the set 
of divinely revealed rules that Muslims must comply with to 
perform their religious duties.  The Shari'a aims to fulfil the 
spiritual and material welfare of the 600 million humans who 
follow Islam, nearly a sixth of entire population of the world.11   At 
the same time, the Shari´a seeks to regulate the entire lives of 
those under its authority.  
The crucial difference between the law in Islam and the law in 
the countries that follow the western legal tradition is their source 
of validity.  In the western tradition, the legislator or judge is 
supreme, depending on whether a particular country belongs to the 
civil or common law tradition.  For instance, in Louisiana, as in 
many systems belonging to the Western tradition, the primary 
sources of law are legislation and custom.12  Legislation is the sole 
                                                                                                             
11. The academic publications regarding Islamic law are numerous.  To 
quote the ones with a comparative approach see R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRET-
SPINOSI, I GRANDI SISTEMI GIURIDICI CONTEMPORANEI (R. Sacco ed., 5th ed., 
2004) and the original French text in R. DAVID & C. JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, LES 
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (10th ed. 1992); and  A. 
GAMBARO & R. SACCO, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI (2d ed. 2002).  
Regarding the specific topic of the law of obligation see D. SANTILLANA, I-II 
ISTITUZIONI DI DIRITTO MUSULMANO MALICHITA CON RIGUARDO  ANCHE AL 
SISTEMA SCIAFIITA (1926-1938). 
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2009). Louisiana is considered a mixed 
jurisdiction, made up of a combination of both civil and common law.  
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expression of legislator’s will and custom, although a primary 
source of law, cannot trump a legislative mandate.13  Islamic law, 
however, is the direct manifestation of the will of the Almighty; it 
is not given by a human lawmaker.  Hence, Islamic law is 
immutable and because God is the source of authority and the sole 
sovereign lawgiver, all human legislation must conform to the 
divine will.14  
The primary written source of Islamic law is the Koran, Islam’s 
holiest scripture, which regulates both legal and non-legal issues. 
The second written source of Islamic law is the Sunna, a 
compilation of the conversations,15 actions, affirmations, 
aphorisms, characteristics, and deeds attributed to the Prophet 
Muhammad.16  Beyond these sources, the Shari'a as a discipline 
was formed over the centuries through the systematic scholarship 
developed by jurists of competing schools of law.  In this sense, 
Sharia is a jurist’s law just as the common law is a judge’s law and 
the civil law is the law of a legislator.17 
Islamic law is applied through a method very similar to the 
civil law.  Through the science of fiqh, jurists determine a rule of 
law by first consulting the sacred sources and then by applying 
their own reasoning.18  To prevent the risk of having a huge 
                                                                                                             
 
However, only in the absence of legislation and custom can a judge step in to 
make law, and in that instance the legislature requires him to rule based on the 
equitable notions of justice, reason, and prevailing usages.  See id. at art. 4.  
13. See id. at arts. 2, 3.  
14. F. Kutty, The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, 
28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 565 (2006).  
15. The conversations are also known as the hadith.  
16. The elements of the Sunna were reported after Muhammad’s death by 
his companions and collected by scholars over the centuries.  The process of 
hadithcompiling for the Sunnis is restricted to the work of six main compilers: 
Bukhari (d. 256/870), Muslim (d. 251/865), Ibn Majjah (d. 273/886), Abu 
Dawud (d. 274/888), Tirmidhi (d. 279/892) and Nasa'i (d. 302/915). Kutty, 
supra note 14, at 585. 
17. See U. MATTEI & P. G. MONATERI, INTRODUZIONE BREVE AL DIRITTO 
COMPARATO (1997). 
18. Fiqh is case law and its products are the result of the jurist's intellectual 
construct.  With English common law it shares the inductive method by 
adducing a number of examples out of which some more general principles can 
be drawn.  It does not posit, as in the civil law tradition, a set of principles from 
which application derives.  But fiqh is different from both in that it is eminently 
casuistic, whilst these cases are not necessarily based on precedents in real life. 
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number of opinions, a perpetual issue in common-law systems, As-
Safi, a famous jurist,19 created the doctrine of the four roots of 
Islamic law to give jurists a fix and common method of finding 
law.20  The first root is, of course, the Qu’ran the second is the 
Sunnah; the third is the Ijma (the consensus reached by the Islamic 
community); and the fourth is the qiyas (analogy).21  The four roots 
are widely accepted in the Islamic community and have suffered 
only slight changes through history.  One such change has practical 
relevance: a proposition can be regarded as a rule of law if at any 
time legal scholars agreed on the issue (something like the Roman 
idea of the communis opinio prudentium).22 
The Islamic tradition affirms that the Holy Law is not given to 
man ready-made, to be passively received and applied.  Rather, it 
is to be actively constructed on the basis of those sacred texts, 
which are its acknowledged sources.  The bulk of Shari'a is based 
on al ijtihad, the science of interpretation and rule-making based 
on the principle that if the sunnah and Qur'an are silent on an 
issue, local custom and scholarly opinion may be used as long as 
they are consistent with the Qur'an and the sunnah.  It means, 
therefore, that it is permissible and possible to supplement 
religious-based law with customary law and interpretation.23  The 
                                                                                                             
 
I. GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW 36 (1981). A.G. 
Muslim, Islamic Laws in Historical Perspective: An Investigation into Problems 
and Principles in the Field of Islamization, 31 ISLAMIC Q. 69 (1987). THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM 288 ( J.L. Esposito ed., 2003). Fiqh is “human 
efforts to codify Islamic norms in practical terms” and such “human generated 
legislation is considered fallible and open to revision.” 
19. As-Safi died in 820. See generally F. CASTRO, DIRITTO MUSULMANO 
(2006).  
20. K. ZWEIGERT & H. KÖTZ, 1 INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO 378 
(Barbara Pozzo trans., 1992) and the origial German text in K. ZWEIGERT & H. 
KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG AUF DEM GEBIETE DES 
PRIVATRECHTS (2d ed. 1984). 
21. A. Hasan, The Definition of Qiyas in Islamic Jurisprudence, 19 ISLAMIC 
STUDIES 1, 22 (1980); see also J. Makdisi, Legal Logic and Equity in Islamic 
Law, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 63 (1985); W.B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic 
Law and the Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985). 
See generally W.B. Hallaq, Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical 
Qiyas, 36 ARABICA 286 (1989). 
22. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 20, at 378. 
23. According to Bernard Weiss: 
The Holy Law is the totality of rules which God has laid down for the 
68                JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES              [Vol. 2 
 
authority of the jurist is derived from the authority of God, but 
there is no authority in the jurist himself.24 
Shari’a does not expound general principles in Islamic law and 
follow them with their detailed application but rather consists of a 
succession of separate issues and topics because it was recorded 
“exactly as it had grown up.”25 
In a certain sense, like Common law, Islamic law is not written 
law.  “In the writings of Muslim jurists, the rules of law are rarely 
set forth directly and in abstract terms the way they are in a code 
elaborated in the civil law tradition or in a statute enacted in a 
common law country.”26  The rules of Islamic law are more often 
expounded upon in connection with specific cases, and for the 
deduction of a generally applicable rule to be expressed in abstract 
terms would call for a more or less full survey of the existing case 
law.27  Indeed, it is when there is no appropriate legal authority or 
the texts are not clear on an issue, the Muslim judge is then 
authorized to apply an accepted principle or an assumption that in 
his opinion would fit best the issue at hand: Qyas.28  
                                                                                                             
 
governing of Man's behaviour; it is the aggregate of ahkam shai’ya.  
Though ordained by God, few of these rules have been precisely 
spelled out for man's convenience; rather, man has the duty to derive 
them from their sources. In the standard Islamic metaphor, the rules 
themselves are “branches” (furu') or “fruit” (thamara), which grow out 
of “roots” (usul), that is, from the sources. Only the roots are given; the 
branches or fruit are not - they must be made to appear; and for this to 
happen human involvement - we may call it, in keeping with the above 
metaphor, human husbandry - is required. 
B. Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihd, 26 AM J. COMP. 
L. 199, 201 (1978).  The five main schools of thought are the Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi'i, Hanbali, and Ja'fari schools of jurisprudence. Id. 
24. For a discussion on how Shari'a is slow to change in some respects, see 
A. E. Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO. L. REV. 1015 (1991). and D.B. 
MACDONALD, DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY, JURISPRUDENCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1913). 
25. N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 47 (1978). 
26. G.M. Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 187, 189 (1978). 
27. Id. 
28. C. Moccia, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and the "Battle of the Forms," 13 FORDHAM INT'L 
L.J. 649, 652 (1989/1990); see also ABDU’R–RAHIM, I PRINCIPI DELLA 
GIURISPRUDENZA MUSULAMANA SECONDO LE SCUOLE HANIFITA, MALEKITA, 
SCIAFEITA E HANBALITA (Cimino trans., 1922).  
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Likewise, a Louisiana lawyer would determine a rule of law 
studying a similar list of sources, or roots.  First, he would consult 
the Civil Code or a relevant revised statute.  He would then 
analyze the case law interpreting the pertinent article or statute. 
Next, he would study scholarly opinions on the issue.  Finally, he 
would use analogy to advocate for, or against, a particular 
decision.  Thus, just as the Islamic jurist works his way from the 
Koran to the gysas, the Louisiana lawyer starts at the civil code 
and ends with an analogy, be it a case or a law.   
 
III. GOOD FAITH, CONTRACTS, AND A DUTY TO DISCLOSE - MAYBE 
 
 An Islamic based contract is somewhat different from what we 
know in the West.29  Under Shari'a principles, a contract is divine 
in nature and there is a sacred duty to uphold one's agreements:  
O you who believe fulfil any contracts [that you make] . . .  
Fulfil God's agreement once you have pledged to do so, and 
do not break any oaths once they have been sworn to. You 
have set God up as a Surety for yourselves.30  
This idea is best stated by the Islamic maxim, “Al Aqd Shari'at al 
muta'aqqidin,” which essentially states, “The contract is the Shari'a 
or sacred law of the parties.”  This makes it clear that the 
contractual relationship is viewed strictly under the Shari'a and 
                                                                                                             
29. See generally N. Saleh, The Law Governing Contracts in Arabia, 38 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 761 (1989); Describing the concept of a contract in Islamic 
society.  The list of specifications in the Qur'an covering commerce is long: it 
includes contracts, the necessity of their certainty, the central importance of 
ethics, the strict requirements of honouring one's obligations, of putting them in 
writing, the importance of trade, in addition to the famous sentence in the 
second chapter explaining how trade has been allowed by God, but riba (interest, 
usury) forbidden.  “Honour your contracts,” v:1, xvii:34; “put your debts in 
writing,” ii:282, “woe to the fraudsters,” lxxxiii:1; “God has allowed commerce 
and prohibited riba,” ii:275.  C. Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: 
Between Classical Transactions and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81, 
91 (2000). 
30. QUR'AN 5:1; see also QUR'AN 16:91.  See, THE HOLY QU’RAN: 
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY (A. Yusuf Ali trans., American Trust 
Publication 2d ed. 1977). 
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clearly would disapprove of the “efficient breach” theory.31  
Indeed, all contractual obligations32 must be specifically 
performed, unless it would contravene the Shari'a or some 
legitimate public policy devised in conformity with the Shari'a.33  
This approach is manifested in contemporary legislation in much 
of the Muslim world.34  The practical effect is that a contract is 
enforceable if it is not contrary to Islamic norms.35  
 Although it is not supported by an express sanction from God, 
Louisiana law, like any other legislation following the French 
model of the Code Napoléon, takes a very similar approach to the 
sanctity of contract.  Louisiana Civil Code article 1983 provides 
that “[c]ontracts have the effect of law between the parties and 
may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on 
grounds provided by law.”  Like Islamic law, Louisiana law allows 
a person to contract with another for any reason or ‘cause,’ unless 
that reason is unlawful because performing the contract would 
produce a result that is illegal or against public policy.36  Thus, 
Louisiana takes an equally strict view toward contractual 
                                                                                                             
31. S.H. AMIN, COMMERCIAL LAW OF IRAN 64-65 (1986). (Explaining that 
the Shari'a views a breach of contract as a religious breach; thus, it is a very 
serious matter). 
32. See generally J.N. Anderson & N.J. Coulson, The Muslim Ruler and 
Contractual Obligations, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 923-28 (1958); S. Habachy, 
Property, Right, and Contract in Muslim Law, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 458-72 
(1962); S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN 
LEGISLATION IN KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 91-100 
(1991); F.E. VOGEL & S.L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, 
RISK AND RETURN 67-68, 97-102 (1998); M. Zahraa, Negotiating Contracts in 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Laws, 13 ARAB. L.Q. 265, 274-77 (1998). 
33. AMIN, supra note 31, at 64. 
34. See e.g., Egyptian Code Civil art. 89 (1958). (“[A] contract is created, 
subject to any special formalities that may be required by law for its conclusion, 
from the moment that two persons have exchanged two concordant intentions.”).  
Similar provisions are contained in the legislation of other Middle Eastern 
nations.  See N. Majeed, Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the 
Shari'a, 20 ARB. INT'L 97, 103-04 (2004). 
35. For example, the position in Saudi Arabia is derived from the Hanbali 
jurist Ibn Taymiya, who wrote, “The rule in contracts and provisions is that 
anything is permitted which is valid and that only that which is forbidden or set 
aside by one of the text or the ‘Qiyas' (reasoning by analogy) is forbidden.” 
Mallat, supra note 29.  
36. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1967-68 (2009). 
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relationships; the only practical difference being that Louisiana 
does not give contracts a sacred or religious effect. 
 
A. Good Faith 
 
The duty to act in good faith is the essence of Islamic contract 
law.  But over and above good faith, there is extensive legal 
scholarship elaborating clear principles of Islamic contract law.  In 
fact, commentators have highlighted the inherent flexibility in 
Islamic law that allows it to accept modern transactions. Indeed, 
“the principle of pacta sunt servanda . . . is recognized by all 
Muslim jurist-theologians.”37  Clearly the emphasis on the notion 
of freedom of contract and the stress on good faith are in line with 
Western conceptions.  At the same time, the sanctity of contracts38 
                                                                                                             
37. M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 204 (1955). 
38. Similar reverence for the ideal of sanctity of agreements (covenants), 
designed to provide a secure transactional framework, informs all schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence: In fact, under traditional Islamic (sharia) law, there is a 
much stronger presumption than in most legal systems for leaving the 
contractually formalized bargain undisturbed.  This is in accordance with the. 
Chapter (sura) 5 of the Qur'an, sometimes called the Chapter of Contracts 
(Surat al-Uqud), begins “with an appeal to fulfil, as sacred, all obligations, 
human and divine . . .” 
In defining obligation, Ali wrote: 
The Arabic word implies so many things that a whole chapter of 
Commentary can be written on it. First, there are the divine obligations 
that arise from our spiritual nature and our relation to Allah . . . But in 
our own human and material life we undertake mutual obligations 
express and implied.  We make a promise; we enter into a commercial 
or social contract; we enter into a contract of marriage; we must 
faithfully fulfil all obligations in all these relationships.  Our group or 
our State enters into a treaty; every individual in that group or State is 
bound to see that as far as lies in his power, such obligations are 
faithfully discharged.   
THE HOLY QU’RAN, supra note 30, at 276 n.682. 
This is particularly so, because a large number of transnational transactions 
(for example, oil and mineral concessions, production sharing projects, joint 
ventures, transfer of technology, construction and operation of public utilities as 
well as loan and other financing agreements), on which the economy of the 
Western world so vitally depends, have been the subject-matter of many 
international commercial disputes and arbitrations.  These have in turn involved 
an interplay of the notions of fairness with the Islamic veneration of the 
stipulations voluntarily inserted by the parties, that is, ufu bil uqud (honor your 
contracts).  See generally P.N. Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on 
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in Islamic law and the public policy regarding which contracts are 
void and unenforceable may produce results that differ from 
Louisiana. 
Under the pure doctrine of caveat emptor, the buyer is afforded 
the opportunity to examine the goods to be purchased  to ensure 
the goods are free from defects).  As a result, the seller is not 
obliged to disclose the item’s defects; hence, let the buyer beware.  
In Islamic law, the pre-contractual stage is known as Musawama, 
“talks or bargaining,” and is based on the principle of good faith 
and fair dealings.39  During this stage of letter exchanges and 
drafting of future contracts, Islamic law limits some freedoms of 
contract that are familiar in Louisiana.40  For example, in Louisiana 
a party can freely withdraw from contractual negotiations until he 
accepts a binding agreement.41  In contrast, Islamic law provides 
for compensation under certain circumstances when one party 
breaks   off   negotiations.42    Additionally,   Muslims   under   the  
Islamic   law   are   less   free   to   determine   the   terms   of  their  
agreements.43  They   are   limited  by   such   principles  as  riba,44  
                                                                                                             
 
Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems: The Formation and Binding 
Force of Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 384 (1970). 
39. D. Elkarkouri, “Pre-Contractual Liability in Islamic Construction 
Contracts,” INT. CONST. L. REV. 545-6 (1992). 
40. See THE CONFERENCE ON COMPARATIVE LINKS BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW 
AND THE COMMON LAW, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (1986); see also for a more 
complete reference C. Chehata, Islamic Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 138-142 (1976); and H. Afchar, The 
Muslim Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, 84-106 (1976). 
41. This rule also prevails in most common law countries.  See generally 
P.N. Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern 
Legal Systems: The formation and Binding force of contracts, 2 COLUM. J. 
TRANS’L L. 384  (1970).  
42. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 546. 
43. S.E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN 
LEGISLATION IN KUWAITI, BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 23 
(1991). 
44. Riba (lit. increase) any increase in a loan or sale transaction which 
accrues to the lender, seller or buyer, without the provision of an equivalent 
counter-value to the other party.  Riba encompasses various types of illicit gain, 
of which banking interest is one example. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM, 
supra note 18. 
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gharar45 or any other Sharia restrictions.46  
 Like under Islamic law, good faith is considered the foundation 
of all obligations under Louisiana law, especially contractual 
obligations.  For instance, Louisiana Civil Code article 1759 
provides that “[g]ood faith shall govern the conduct of the obligor 
and the obligee in whatever pertains to the obligation.”47  Article 
1983 then places good faith at the basis of the contractual 
relationship as “[c]ontracts must be performed in good faith.” 
However, for good faith to apply, there must be at least a pre-
existing obligation. As yet, there is no general obligation under 
Louisiana law to negotiate in good faith.  As a result, Louisiana 
courts have been unwilling to use the good faith principle to 
impose a pre-contractual duty of disclosure.  Thus, good faith has a 
much more limited role in Louisiana than in Islamic law, having 
effect only after a contract or obligation has come into existence. 
  
B. A Duty of Disclosure and a Common Idea of Defects 
 
Islamic law has both jurisprudential and codal duties of 
disclosure. In Islamic jurisprudence, the idea of disclosure is 
embodied in the Khiyar or option.  The option literally allows a 
party, under certain circumstances, to unilaterally decide whether 
to rescind or uphold a contract.48 Within the realm of disclosure 
                                                                                                             
45. Gharar is uncertainty in a contract of exchange as to the existence of the 
subject matter of the contract and deliverability, quantity, or quality of the 
subject matter.  It also involves contractual ambiguity as to the consideration 
and the terms of the contract.  Such ambiguity will render most contracts void. 
There are a number of Hadith that forbid trading in gharar, often giving specific 
examples of gharhar transactions (e.g., selling the birds in the sky or the fish in 
the water, the catch of the diver, an unborn calf in its mother’s womb, the sperm 
and unfertilized eggs of camels, etc.).  K.M. Kahn, Juristic Classification of 
Islamic Law, 6 HOU. J. INT’L L. 23, 23-25 (1983).  Contrast this with the 
aleatory contracts in Louisiana, such as the sale of a hope: “Thus, a fisherman 
may sell a haul of his net before he throws it.  In that case the buyer is entitled to 
whatever is caught in the net, according to the parties' expectations, and even if 
nothing is caught the sale is valid.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2451 (2009). 
46. It is very interesting to consider the parallel with another religion 
oriented legal system. See J.R. Wagner, Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence: 
The Four Roots of Islamic Law and Their Talmudic Counterparts, 1 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 25 (1982).  
47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1759 (2007) (emphasis added).  
48. Center of Muslim-Jewish Engagement at University of Southern 
California, Vol. 3, Book 34, Num. 322, available at 
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duties, there are two types of options: the option for defect (Khiyar 
al-ayb) and the option of inspection (Khiyar al’Ru’yyah).  These 
options are available to buyers in sales contracts, as well as in 
other commutative contracts and function as an implied warranty 
against defects.49  The option of defect is “a right given to a 
prospective purchaser to revoke or to accomplish a contract 
because of a defect discovered in the subject matter.”50  Or, as 
stated by an Islamic jurist, “A purchaser has a right of option on 
account of defects in the thing bought, of which he has become 
aware only after taking possession, but which existed 
previously.”51  This option is established without stipulation. When 
a person purchases a good with a defect, no matter if it is trivial or 
flagrant,52 he may retain the object at its full price or reject it, but 
                                                                                                             
 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/ha
dith/bukhari/034.sbt.html (last visited on September 20, 2009). Narrator Ibn 
'Umar states: 
Allah's Apostle said, “The seller and the buyer have the option of 
cancelling or confirming the deal unless they separate, or one of them 
says to the other, 'Choose (i.e. decide to cancel or confirm the bargain 
now).” Perhaps he said, 'Or if it is an optional sale.'”Ibn Umar, Shuraih, 
Ash-Shabi, Tawus, Ata, and Ibn Abu Mulaika agree upon this 
judgment.   
The Prophet said, “The buyer and the seller have the option to cancel or 
confirm the bargain before they separate from each other or if the sale is 
optional.” Nafi said, “Ibn 'Umar used to separate quickly from the seller if he 
had bought a thing which he liked.”  Id. at n. 320.  
AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, no. 31.38.79 at 272. “Yahya related to me 
from Malik from Nafi’ from ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar that the Messenger of Allah, 
may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said, “Both parties in a business 
transaction have the right of withdrawal as long as they have not separated, 
except in the transaction called khiyar.”  Malik said, “There is no specified limit 
nor any matter which is applied in this case according to us.”  
49. A.Q. ZUBAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC LAW OF CONTRACT 122 (1991). 
50. Id. at 137. 
51. M.M. Billah, Caveat Emptor versus Khiyar Al-Aib, a Dichotomy, 13 
ARAB. L. Q. 278 (1998). 
52. N.E. BAILLIE, THE MOOHUMUNDAN LAW OF SALE, ACCORDING TO THE 
HUNEEFEEA CODE: FROM THE FUTAWA ALUMGEREEREE, A DIGEST OF THE 
WHOLE LAW 99 (1975).  Defines a flagrant defect the one that happens if two 
valuators agree that the defect lowered the value of the item purchased.  “. . . On 
the other hand, when one of them insists that the thing is still worth what the 
other alleges to be its full value in a perfect state, though he maintains its present 
worth to be somewhat less, the defect is said to be slight or trivial.”  From page 
100 to 119 Baille refers of a list of defects in the slaves and animals similar to 
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he cannot retain it and seek for compensation for the defect.53 A 
defect is any cause that lowers the value of the object, according to 
the custom of experienced merchants and the like.54 Additionally, 
Islamic law gives a party the option of pleading defect regardless if 
the buyer was ignorant of the defect when he concluded the 
contract.55  The general principle of the Khiyar al-‘aib provides the 
exercise of option in a way that the buyer might uphold the 
contract or rescind it by giving the defective goods back to the 
seller without the right to seek any compensation.56  
Aib means a defect or a fault impairing the value of a contract.  
Had it been known, the contract would not have been concluded.  
Therefore, the agreement is not valid and the deceived party has 
the right to rescind the contract.  Any party can rescind the contract 
by a Khiyar without recourse to a court.  
As a corollary, a seller is under an absolute duty to correctly 
and honestly disclose known latent defects, a duty which is based 
on the ban against providing erroneous information that causes 
material loss.57  Indeed, in article 336 of the Mejella, which is a 
                                                                                                             
 
the list included in the Digest: it is noteworthy to stress how two so distant legal 
worlds (Islam and Latin) faced the same problems.  This inquiry, even if 
fascinating, is too broad for the scope of this work.  
53. Id. at 98. 
54. Id. at 100. 
55. Id. Considering the right of the buyer to recover for defects if those 
defects were present before the period of sale are, by consensus, valid causes for 
litigation and recovery.  Scholars differed to those that appear during the period 
of sale and before the sale are finalized.  Malik established that the buyer has 
three days to raise the presence of a defect, after which time the claim must be 
dropped; while in the case that the defect is of the type that does not appear 
except seasonally (or except over a long period of time) he allotted one year.  An 
example of this would be the sale of an animal with Mange, the mange having 
been treated before the sales period but as it is known that without re-treatment 
it will reappear.  The three day period was substantiated by a hadith (judged 
weak by the opposing opinion) and the period of one year was affirmed by 
precedent found in the custom of the people of Medina.  This application may be 
viewed as similar to the principle of caveat emptor in English Common Law, 
although not synonymous. 
56. S.C. SIRCAR, AL-SHARI’S: SUNNO & IMAMIA CODES 496 (2006).  
57. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 545. Under pre-contractual law, Islamic 
jurists made an important distinction between cases where pre-purchased 
merchandise is delivered for examination and cases where merchandise is 
delivered for agreement on a purchase price.  In the former situation, the risk of 
defective merchandise is on the sender, especially in cases where the price is not 
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complete code on Islamic law dated of year 1876 and connected 
with the Ottoman Empire, there is an implied warranty that the 
thing sold should be free from any defect: “A sale, without any 
stipulation, makes it necessary that the thing sold should be free 
from defect.”58  In article 339, the Mejella clarifies this point, 
stating that “an ancient defect is a fault which existed in the thing 
sold when it was in the hands of the seller.”59  This duty to disclose 
exists regardless of whether the parties to the agreement have 
between them any fiduciary relationship or whether the 
disclosure60 of such defects was requested by the seller.  Thus, 
when the seller violates this duty, the injured party has the option 
to rescind the contract.61  This idea is buttressed by the Holy 
Tradition, according to which it is illegal for a seller to sell a thing 
if he knows that it has a defect, unless the seller informs the buyer 
of that defect.62  In addition, Muhammad warned against selling 
goods if defects were not disclosed: “if anyone sells a defective 
article without drawing attention to it, he will remain under God’s 
anger, or the Angels will continue to curse him.”63 
 Like its common and civil law counterparts, exercise of the 
khiyar al-‘aib is subject to several conditions.  First, the defect in 
the goods must exist before the goods are given to the buyer.64 
Notice that the risk of loss passes with possession. For instance, 
Article 340 of the Mejella provides that a defect that arises after 
                                                                                                             
 
yet fixed.  In the second situation, the risk of defective goods is on the buyer.  
Even if an Islamic court ensures that parties abide by the terms of the contract, 
the court would not compensate a party for damages a mere mistake causes. 
Under the principles of Sharia, victims cannot recover damages where the 
mistake is exclusive.  Additionally, Islamic law does not grant any 
compensation for breaking off negotiations or for the loss of expectation 
interests.  
58. THE MEJELLE, BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MAJALLAHEL-
AHKAM-I-ADLIYA AND A COMPLETE CODE ON ISLAMIC CIVIL LAW 48, art. 336 
(Tyser et al. trans., 1980) (1901) (Hereinafter THE MEJELLE). 
59. “An ancient defect is a fault, which existed in the thing sold, when it 
was in the hands of the seller.” Id. at 49, art. 339.  
60. A. Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA 
L. REV. 337 (1997). 
61. Elkarkouri, supra note 39, at 547. 
62. BILLAH, supra note 51, at 287. 
63. Id. (quoting Ibn. Mayah). 
64. Id. at 99. 
2009]            CAVEAT EMPTOR’S CURRENT ROLE            77 
 
the sale but before delivery, while the thing is in the hands of the 
seller, is a ground for rescission.65  In other words, the seller is 
liable for all defects that arise before delivery of the goods to the 
buyer, even if the goods were in perfect or merchantable condition 
when the contract was concluded.66  
In addition to the timing of the defect, in order to profit from 
the protection the buyer must not be aware of the defects in the 
goods.67  This idea is connected with the option for inspection.  
The buyer must have an opportunity to inspect the goods, but if he 
becomes aware of the defect and still concludes the contract, he 
has tacitly waived his option to rescind.  Also, the buyer cannot 
exempt the seller from liability through an express stipulation.68  
Finally, the defect must have existed at the time the buyer 
exercised the option.69 
The buyer loses his right of option even if the goods are 
discovered to be defective in the following situations.  First, if the 
seller tells the buyer (or otherwise gives him notice) that there is a 
defect in the goods.70  This is a counterpoint of the Islamic laws 
duty of disclosure.  Since the seller has an absolute duty to disclose 
the defects in the product he is selling, when he discloses those 
defects, the buyer having bought with knowledge has no option to 
rescind the contract.  Second, a seller has no liability for defects in 
his goods when he stipulates with the buyer that he will have no 
such liability.71  Nevertheless, if the seller knows of the defects in 
                                                                                                             
65. THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 340 at 49. The meaning of rescission 
in the Islamic contract law is a broad one; it encompasses the contract voidable 
and the contract valid but not binding. M.A. BAHARUM, MISREPRESENTATION: A 
STUDY OF ENGLISH AND ISLAMIC CONTRACT LAW 285 (1986).   
66. W.F. Fratcher, Uses of Uses, 34 MO. L. REV. 39, 39 (1969). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. S.R. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACT IN ISLAMIC LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE MODERN 
LEGISLATION IN KUWAITI, BAHRAIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 331 
(1991). 
70. “If a seller, at the time of the sale, shews a defect in the thing sold, and 
the buyer accepts with that defect, he cannot have an option on account of that 
defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, at 49, art. 341. 
71. “When a seller sells a property with a condition that he is to be free 
from claims for all defects, there is no option for defect for the buyer.” THE 
MEJELLE, supra note 58, at 49, art. 342. 
See also IMAN MALIK IBN ANAS, AL MUWATTA OF IMAM MALIK IBN ANAS 
248 (Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley Trans., 1989). (Hereinafter AL MUWATTA). 
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his goods and purposely stipulates with the buyer to protect 
himself from that defect, the stipulation in null.  He who sells (with 
an exemption clause for the defects of the goods) will not be 
responsible for any defect unless he knew and purposely concealed 
it, the earlier exemption clause shall have no effect and he (the 
seller) shall still be responsible for the defects.72 
 Thirdly, the seller is not liable for defects if, after the contract 
is concluded, the buyer agrees to be deemed solely liable for such 
defects.73  Fourthly, if the buyer consciously accepts the defects of 
the goods, the seller is exculpated from liability.74 Likewise, the 
seller is absolved from liability if the buyer knows of the defect75 
and exercises ownership over the goods in any of the following 
ways: (1) eating any portion of the goods;76 (2) keeping the goods 
in his possession for a reasonable period of time; (3) repairing or 
demolishing any part of the goods; or (4) disposing of the goods.77  
Finally, the seller is not liable if the defects occurred in the hands 
of the buyer.78 
In the Islamic legal system, two principles coexist.  The seller 
must disclose the defects in the goods he is selling.  The buyer 
must also inspect the goods (interpreted as a right and also as a 
duty) as a sort of cooperative activity in the sale. Once the goods 
have been scrutinized, the Islamic solution focuses on the 
simplification of the transaction.  In fact, the buyer has the right of 
option either to continue or to rescind the contract before or after 
the conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement with the aim of 
ensuring the quality of the goods.79 
                                                                                                             
72. AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, at 249.  
73.  “If there’s a property saying ‘it is accepted with all defects,’ there is no 
longer a right of action for defect.”  THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 343 at 49.  
For example, if a buyer purchases an animal stating it is accepted even if blind, 
lame and unsound or worthless maybe return it on the ground that it has an old 
defect.  
74. RAYNER, supra note 69, at 340. 
75. BAILLE, supra note 52, at 105. 
76. K. BHAVAN, THE HEDAYA: COMMENTARY ON THE ISLAMIC LAWS, 2, at 
415 (Charles Hamilton trans., 1985). (Hereinafter THE HEDAYA). 
77. “If the purchaser dispose of the thing sold, in a manner, which is an 
exercise of the right of ownership in it, after he knows of a defect in it, he has 
destroyed his option for the defect.” THE MEJELLE, supra note 58, art. 344 at 49.   
78. See AL MUWATTA, supra note 71, no 31.4 at 249. 
79. As it has already been pointed out the common law grants the right to 
inquire the goods only before the conclusion of the contract. 
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Louisiana, following the civil law tradition is very protective of 
purchasers when the things they buy contain some sort of flaw or 
defect.  Because of this increased concern for protecting buyers, 
Louisiana extensively uses the duty to disclose in the context of 
redhibitory defects.  The seller’s obligation to provide an implied 
warranty is established in several code articles. First, article 2475 
provides that “the seller is bound . . . to warrant to the buyer 
ownership and peaceful possession of, and the absence of hidden 
defects in, that thing. The seller also warrants that the thing sold is 
fit for its intended use.”80  Pursuant to Civil Code article 2520, 
“[t]he seller warrants the buyer against redhibitory defects, or 
vices, in the thing sold.”81  That article goes on further to explain 
that a defect is redhibitory in three situations: (1) where the defect 
renders the thing useless; (2) where the defect renders the thing so 
inconvenient that it can be presumed that the buyer would not have 
purchased it if he had known of the defect; and (3) the defect 
diminishes the purchased item’s usefulness so that the buyer would 
have only purchased it at a lesser price.82  
 Louisiana creates a duty on the seller to disclose any defects 
through the imposition of heightened remedies for the purchaser. 
For instance, if a seller does not know of the defect in the thing 
sold, Civil Code article 2531 allows him several options.  First, the 
seller has the right to repair the thing, and it is only when he cannot 
or refuses to do so that he will be liable for a return of the purchase 
price.83  In addition, the seller will have to pay interest starting 
from the time that the price was paid as well as reimburse the 
buyer for sales expenses and perseveration costs.84  Finally, a seller 
in this context has a right to have his liability to the buyer reduced 
by the use that the buyer made of the thing.85 
 Contrast the remedies listed above with those afforded to a 
buyer when the seller is in bad faith (i.e., knew of the defect in the 
thing sold).  To begin with, the seller in this context has no right to 
                                                                                                             
80. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2475 (2007).  This article is similar to the 
concept contained in the English Sale of Goods Act of 1979, which contains 
both a warranty of quality or fitness as well as a warranty of description. Sale of 
Goods Act, 1979, 2, §§ 13-14 (Eng.).   
81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (2007). 
82. Id. 
83. See id. at art. 2531. 
84. Id. 
85. Id.  
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repair the defective product and is immediately liable for a return 
of the purchase price.86  In addition to being responsible for the 
buyer’s reasonable sales and preservation expenses, the seller will 
also have to pay damages and attorney’s fees.87  Finally, the seller 
has no right to seek a reduction in his liability for the value of the 
buyer’s use of the defective thing.  This ability to reduce his 
liability is left to the sole discretion of the court.88 
The buyer’s ability to recover damages against a bad faith seller 
is of significant importance.  Pursuant to Louisiana’s general 
contract rules, non-pecuniary damages (mental anguish) can only 
be recovered in two circumstances: (1) when the contract is 
intended to gratify a non-pecuniary interest and the obligor either 
knew or should have known that his failure to perform would 
cause non-pecuniary damage and (2) when regardless of the nature 
of the contract, the obligor breached the contract with the intent of 
aggrieving the obligee’s feelings.89  Nevertheless, Louisiana courts 
have allowed buyers to recover non-pecuniary damages in the 
context of redhibition, even if the claim does not meet the general 
contractual standards for non-pecuniary loss.  
 For instance, in Bourne v. Rein Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,90 the 
plaintiff was allowed to recover mental anguish damages after 
buying a defective automobile from a dealership.91  The plaintiff 
claimed that the seller failed to disclose any mechanical defects in 
the car.92  After the car was purchased it began to act sluggish and 
the engine frequently died.93  Subsequently, the horn began to 
spontaneously activate and the engine began to race.94  In addition, 
the door panel fell off and the vinyl roof began to bubble up.95  The 
cruise control then broke and a portion of the engine became 
disconnected and created a hole in the hood.96  Finally, the air 
                                                                                                             
86. See id. at art. 2545. 
87. Id.  
88. Id.  
89. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1998 (2007). 
90. 463 So. 2d 1356 (La. App. 1st  Cir. 1985). 
91. Id. at 1361. 
92. Id. at 1357. 
93. Id. at 1357-58. 
94. Id. at 1357. 
95. Id.  
96. Id.  
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conditioner broke and flooded the interior of the car with water.97 
To add insult to the plaintiff’s injury, her frequent trips to the 
repair shop invoked taunting and laughter by the service 
personnel.98  The court deviated from the general, strict 
requirements for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages99 and 
found that when a seller delivers a defective product it creates not 
only contractual but also delictual liability.100  Therefore, the court 
allowed the plaintiff to recover for her emotional damage as well 
as her contractual redhibition claim without instituting another 
action in tort.  
 Nevertheless, Louisiana stands by the notion, even in its 
articles on redhibition, that it will not save a buyer from a bad 
bargain.  Thus, pursuant to Civil Code article 2521, a seller is not 
liable to the buyer for any defects which are either made known 
(disclosed) or “should have been discovered by a reasonably 
prudent buyer.”101  Therefore, if the defect is such that the buyer 
should have discovered it with a reasonable inspection, the law 
will afford him no remedy and it will relieve the seller of any duty 
to disclose.102  
 The importance of Louisiana’s use of redhibition to create a 
duty of disclosure in sales cannot be overstated.  Whereas general 
Louisiana contract theory does not always require the seller to 
disclose his knowledge about the thing sold, the state’s law of 
redhibition steps up to fill the gap.  Thus, through the imposition of 
increased liability on the part of a seller who knew the item being 
sold contained a defect and failed to disclose it, Louisiana creates a 
duty of disclosure that provides an extreme sense of protection to 
purchasers. 
 
                                                                                                             
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1360. 
100. Id. at 1359-60 (citing Phillippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d 310 
(La. 1981)).  
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 (2007). 
102. This is not a deviation from the civil law tradition, according to which 
the guarantee arises only for hidden defects (the buyer should show some care in 
buying: the so called principle of auto-responsibility).  In many legislations there 
are provisions excluding the remedy for obvious/apparent defects (but the seller 
is liable if he expressed some appreciation on the soundness of the good, or if he 
hid the defect). 
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IV. THE VICES OF CONSENT 
 
A. The Louisiana Perspective 
 
 Louisiana does not have a general duty to disclose. In that 
sense, it is no different than any of the forty-nine other American 
states.  Louisiana does, however, create specific duties of 
disclosure in certain instances.  The formation of consent is the 
first place Louisiana courts have found a specific duty of 
disclosure.  More specifically, Louisiana’s law on error and fraud 
overlap, so that when a person knows another is contracting under 
an error, it is very possible that the requirements of fraud may be 
met.  It is in this gray area where the laws of fraud and error 
intertwine that Louisiana creates a contract law based duty of 
disclosure. 
In Louisiana, error and fraud are seen as vitiating, or creating a 
defect in, consent; nevertheless, a contract based on either error or 
fraud still produces some legal effects.103  Pursuant to civil code’s 
article 1949, error vitiates consent only if the following two 
elements are met: (1) the error concerns a cause without which the 
obligation would not have been incurred104 and (2) the other party 
                                                                                                             
103.  According to theory, error should prevent a contract from ever coming 
into existence.  However, such a rule totally disregards the reality of business 
practice; therefore, in an effort to inject stability in transactions, Louisiana law 
views error as a reason for allowing a party to get out of a contract instead of the 
prevention of the contracts formation.  Id. 
104. The first requirement, when an error concerns a cause, is governed 
expressly by the code.  Pursuant to article 1950, an error concerns a cause in five 
different situations: (1) when it bears on the nature of the contract; (2) when it 
bears on the thing that is the object of the contract or a substantial quality of the 
contractual object; (3) when it bears on either the person, or a substantial quality 
of the other party; (4) when it bears on the law; or (5) when it bears on any other 
circumstances that the parties either actually or should have regarded in good 
faith as the cause.  LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1950 (2007).  It bears noting that this 
formulation is almost exactly the same as the Italian rules governing when a 
mistake is considered essential.  Note, however, that having an error fall into one 
of the categories is necessary but not determinative of the issue.  The party in 
error must still show that they would not have contracted had they not been in 
error; this is a heavier burden than just that they would have contracted on 
different terms. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950 cmt. (g) (2007).  See also Litvinoff, 
Vices of Consent, Error, Fraud, Duress and Epilogue of Lesion, 50 LA. L. REV. 
1, 12-13 (1989).  In addition, there are specific cases where the party will not be 
allowed to take advantage of his error regardless of whether it meets the 
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either knew or should have known of that cause.105  Professor 
Litvinoff describes error as creating an impairment that “results 
from a sort of accident that takes place in a person’s subjective 
process of assembling an act of volition,”106 or more specifically, 
“a false or inexact idea that a party to a contract has of an element 
of that contract.”107  
Pursuant to article 1950, the first requirement for error, that 
concerns the principle cause, is met if the error:  
[B]ears on the nature of the contract, or the thing that is the 
contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or 
the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or 
any other circumstances that the parties regarded, or should 
in good faith have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.108   
The second requirement, that the non-mistaken party either knows 
or should have known of the cause, is an objective reasonableness 
test, determined on the facts and circumstances of each individual 
case.  
If the error is one that concerns the principle cause, it is very 
likely that the circumstances will be such that each party will 
know, by evaluating the circumstances, the principle cause behind 
                                                                                                             
 
elements: these situations include transactions or compromise made and based 
an error of law and payment of a civil obligation when the party was only bound 
by a natural obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art 1950 cmt. (h) (2007). 
105. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1949 (2007). See also Litvinoff, supra note 
104, at 12.  A distinction should be made with respect to the non-mistaken 
party’s knowledge: it is not knowledge of the error that is important in 
determining that consent is vitiated, it is the knowledge of the cause itself- the 
reason why the party obligated himself.  The non-mistaken party’s knowledge of 
the error only becomes important in the determination of who pays damages. 
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1952 (2007). 
106. Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 6. Error is basically a situation in which a 
party to a contract is acting under a false sense of reality. Id. 
107. S. LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LOUISIANA 
JURISPRUDENCE 234 (5th ed. 2000). 
108. Surprisingly, this is very similar to the English common law’s notion 
of a “fundamental mistake,” which is defined as a mistake “as to the substance 
of the whole consideration . . . going . . . to the whole root of the matter.” G.H. 
TREITEL, AN OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 100 (4th ed. 1989) (1975).  
For a more in-depth discussion of what types of mistakes are considered 
fundamental in the English Common Law, see S.A. SMITH, ATIYAH’S 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 172-175 (6th ed. 2005) (1961).  
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the other’s consent.  In these situations, the test will be met 
because objectively the circumstances allowed the parties to know 
each other’s principal reason for contracting.  However, this is not 
always the case, and in some circumstances a party may have a 
particular subjective reason for binding himself.  In those instances 
it would be necessary for that party to take steps to inform the 
other party of his unique principal cause; otherwise, the right claim 
of operative error will be lost. 
For instance, in Bordelon v. Kopicki, a Louisiana appellate 
court refused to rescind a contract for the sale of a house based on 
the buyer’s unilateral error.109  The purchasers’ principal cause for 
binding themselves to buy the house was to convert it into a larger 
four bedroom home; the problem was that they did not tell the 
seller what they had in mind.110  A short time before the sale was 
to close, the purchasers discovered that the house could not be 
converted into a four bedroom home because of a right of way held 
by the city; thus, unsurprisingly, they refused to buy and conclude 
the actual sale.111  The court stated that the apparent, objective 
reason for the purchase was for the buyers to get a suitable 
home.112  The seller was neither made aware of nor should he be 
presumed to have been aware of the buyer’s purpose of converting 
the home.113  Thus, the seller had no way of knowing that the 
servitude would affect the buyers’ consent, so the requirements of 
article 1950 were not met and consent was not vitiated—no 
operative error.114  
As stated above, there is no general duty of disclosure in 
Louisiana, so merely meeting the requirements for error will not 
create any duties of disclosure between the parties.  This is shown 
by looking at article 1952, which states that a party who has a 
contract rescinded based on his own error is liable to the non-
                                                                                                             
109. 524 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 3d. Cir. 1988).  
110. Id.  
111. Id.  
112.  Id. at 849.  
113. Id.  
114. Professor Ronald Scalise sees this case in a somewhat different light.  
He thinks that because the servitude was recorded in the public records, the 
buyer has constructive knowledge. Therefore, the buyers lost because their error 
was inexcusable.  This is definitely a valid reading of this case.  However, the 
court did not discuss either the public records doctrine or duties of disclosure.   
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mistaken party for any loss sustained.115  Obviously the law would 
not allow a non-mistaken party to recover damages if he violated a 
duty he owed to the party in error.  Thus, Louisiana’s error rules do 
not in and of themselves create disclosure requirements. 
Disclosure requirements in Louisiana begin to emerge when 
the non-mistaken party’s actions start to approach the level of 
fraud. In fact, as alluded to earlier, there is quite a bit of overlap 
between Louisiana’s rules of fraud and error.  Louisiana defines 
fraud as “a misrepresentation or suppression of the truth made with 
the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or 
to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other.”116  But more 
importantly, “fraud may also result from silence or inaction.”117  It 
is this silence or inaction language that is at the heart of 
Louisiana’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure.  
It is common knowledge that silence or inaction does not 
always constitute fraud.  Louisiana is no exception to this rule; it 
does, however, uniformly punish a party who remains silent when 
he knows the other is acting under an error, just under different 
sets of rules.  For instance, when one party knows another party is 
operating under an error and remains silent and that silence is not 
fraudulent, Louisiana sanctions him by denying him the right to 
recover damages when the contract is rescinded for error. 
Specifically, article 1952 states that in such a circumstance, the 
non-mistaken party is barred from recovering damages from the 
other party’s error if he “knew or should have known of the 
error.”
118
  Thus, for non-fraudulent non-disclosures, Louisiana 
does not create an express, positive duty of disclosure but does 
impose a negative sanction. 
The sanction contained in article 1952 presupposes that if a 
party knows another is operating under an error there is something 
wrong with not bringing it to his attention.  This presupposition is 
not new; in civil law, if a person had knowledge that another party 
                                                                                                             
115. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 (2007) (emphasis added).  One of the 
main factors that go into both the court’s decision of whether or not to rescind 
the contract and whether it will award the non-mistaken party damages is 
whether the error is excusable. LA CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 cmt. (d) (2007). 
Thus, if the buyer makes an error which is based on his own negligence, the 
court will be very hostile to his claim for rescission. 
116. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1953 (2007). 
117. Id. (emphasis added).  
118.  LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1952 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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was making an error at the time the contract was formed, he is 
guilty of fraud.119  Obviously, Louisiana does not have such a 
broad definition of fraud; however, it recognizes that something is 
not right in knowing someone is acting in error and remaining 
silent. Louisiana law begins to get interesting when that silence 
starts to look fraudulent. 
Three things happen when a party knows another is acting in 
error and his silence looks like fraud.  First, the requirements for an 
operative error are lowered.120  Specifically, the error no longer has 
to concern the contract’s principal cause, 121 but the lesser standard 
of only “a circumstance that has substantially influenced the 
contract.”122  Second, the silent party will be liable for damages.123  
Damages for fraud include attorney’s fees and so called “bad faith 
obligor” damages, which consist not only of the generally allowed 
foreseeable damages but also of all damages that are a direct 
consequence of the silence, regardless of foreseeability.124  And 
third, it is much more likely that the court will find a positive duty 
of pre-contractual disclosure.  This last item mentioned, obviously, 
requires further discussion. 
                                                                                                             
119. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1949 cmt. (d) (2007). 
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1955 (2007). 
121. Louisiana refers to the reason why a party obligates himself as the 
“cause” on the contract.  See S. Litvinoff, Still Another Look at Cause, 48 La. L. 
Rev. 3, 26 (1987).  Professor Litvinoff provides an example of an error vitiating 
consent with the following hypothetical: 
For example, in need of information on a particular subject, a person 
may walk into a bookstore and, after advising the attendant of his 
interest, buy a book that, in spite of its misleading title, does not deal 
with that subject.  It is clear in such a case that the reason that prompted 
the person to bind himself to pay a price was to obtain a book on a 
certain subject and that an error was made concerning the subject 
treated in the book he bought.  Such an error should entitle that person 
to obtain rescission of the contract of sale he made at the bookstore.  
On the other hand, if the book actually deals with the subject of his 
interest, the purchaser should not be allowed to obtain rescission on 
ground of an error in the quality of the paper of that book, as it can be 
readily concluded that the quality of the paper was not the reason why 
he bought the book.   
Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 13.  
122. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1955 (2007). 
123. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1958 (2007). 
124. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1997 (2007). 
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A good example of how “fraudulent” looking silence will lead 
a Louisiana court to find a pre-contractual duty of disclosure is 
evident in C.H. Boehmer Sales Agency v. Russo.125  In Russo, a 
partnership was in need of a commercially zoned property to 
continue its business.126  The partners were made aware of a piece 
of property for sale that was formerly operated as a service station, 
but was currently empty and up for sale.127  Unbeknownst to the 
partnership, the service station was in a non-commercial zone even 
though an iron works operation was located directly across the 
street.128  The station itself was zoned “industrial non-conforming,” 
which meant that only the service station could be operated on the 
property; if the station was either altered or sat unused for six 
months, its zoning would convert into purely residential.129  When 
the partners inspected the property, they informed the seller that 
they would need to alter the building to make it larger.130  The 
seller, who knew of the particular zoning issue, failed to disclose 
this fact to the partners and accepted $200 in return for the 
partners’ option to purchase the property.131  
The court rescinded the option contract on the grounds of error. 
More importantly, the court held that the seller was under a duty to 
disclose the true status of the property to the partners.132  The court 
stated that the partners were reasonable in the belief that the 
service station was zoned commercial it was across the street from 
a commercial operation and was not located in an obvious 
residential area.133  That, in conjunction with the fact that they 
made their purposes known to the seller, imposed upon him a duty 
to disclose the zoning issue to the partners.  
Another example of when Louisiana courts found a duty to 
disclose is Deutschmann v. Standard Fur Company, Inc.  In 
Standard Fur, a lady ordered a fur coat made to her 
specifications.134  She gave the furrier instructions that the coat be 
                                                                                                             
125. 99 So. 2d 475 (La. App. 1958).  
126. Id.  
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 476. 
129.  Id. 
130. Id. 
131.  Id. 
132. Id. at 476-77. 
133. Id. 
134. 331 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976). 
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made of horizontally running, continuous female furs of the same 
width as a sample coat she had been shown.135  The furrier, which 
had forty years of experience, failed to inform the buyer that it was 
impossible to make a coat pursuant to her specifications.136  As a 
result, the lady refused to accept the coat upon delivery because it 
was different that what she thought she was going to receive.137  
The court rescinded the sale on the grounds of error.  Specifically, 
the court held that the store was the expert and as such had a duty 
to tell the buyer that it could not make the coat in the manner she 
specified.138 
Both of these cases together shed some light on Louisiana’s 
view of pre-contractual duties of disclosure.  While there is no 
general duty of disclosure, when one party knows that the other is 
operating under some error, the courts will take a much closer look 
at the situation.  At a minimum, if the non-mistaken party knows of 
the mistake being made (and of course that mistake meets the error 
requirements) and fails to inform the other party of his error, he 
will be punished by losing his ability to recover damages when the 
contract is rescinded.139  However, depending on the 
                                                                                                             
135.  Id.  
136. Id. at 221.  
137. Id. at 220.  
138. Id. at 221. 
139. It is vital to understand that the error rules have to be met for this 
result, courts have a lot of room to manoeuvre here.  For instance, an error in 
fair market value of an object is not actionable under the rules of error in 
Louisiana.  In Dixon v. Bohn, the seller of an automobile was found not to have 
a duty to disclose certain information to the buyer.  04-503 (La. App. 5 Cir. 
11/30/04); 890 So. 2d 613.  The buyer purchased a vehicle for the price of 
$20,874.86. Id. at 614.  The retail price that was suggested by the manufacturer 
was only $17,467.00. Id.  Believing that he had been overcharged, the buyer 
petitioned the court asking it to award him both damages and attorney’s fees. Id. 
The court refused, stating that the purchaser had no cause of action because 
there was “no requirement in our law that the seller informs the buyer of the fair 
market value of property.” Id. at 615. 
This same result was obtained in the context of the sale of an immovable. In 
Pioneer Valley Hospital, Inc. v. Elmwood Partners, the court held that the 
purchaser of a hospital could not rescind the sale based on the seller’s failure to 
disclose the fair market value. 01-453 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/17/01); 800 So. 2d 
932, 935-36.  The buyers claimed that a restrictive covenant in the sale contract 
lowered the fair market value and being that the sellers had been involved in 
similar sales in the past knew of the covenant’s effect on the market value.  Id. at 
934.  The court rejected the claim that the sellers had any duty to disclose.  Id. at 
935-36.  The court stated that “as long as all facts bearing on the nature of a 
2009]            CAVEAT EMPTOR’S CURRENT ROLE            89 
 
circumstances, the non-mistaken party may find himself liable for 
fraud, which has the effect of lowering the standards necessary for 
an error to be operative and allowing for the recovery of attorney 
fees and other bad-faith based damages. 
Like all things in the realm of law, this is not an absolute rule. 
Louisiana courts are not so friendly to persons who just fail to 
make reasoned decisions or take reasonable steps necessary to 
protect their interests.  Parties in contractual negotiations are 
working to protect their own interest and obtain the best deal 
possible.  Thus, as a general rule, failing to provide a party with 
information which he should have found by himself does not 
constitute fraud.140  This is expressly stated in Civil Code article 
1954, which provides, “Fraud does not vitiate consent when the 
party against whom the fraud was directed could have ascertained 
the truth without difficulty, inconvenience, or special skill.”141  
                                                                                                             
 
property are disclosed, the effect of those facts is left of a buyer to determine.  
‘[E]rror as to the value of land, which is the object of the contract, is not error of 
fact, but error of judgment, for which the law furnishes no relief.’”  Id. at 936. 
140. Id. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 (2007).  
Where the means of knowledge are as hand, and equally available to 
both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their 
inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and 
opportunities, he will not be heard to say  .  .  .  that he was deceived by 
the vendor’s misrepresentations.  
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 cmt. (a) (2007) (citing Rocchi v. Schwabacher & 
Hirsch, 33 La.Ann. 1364, 1368 (1881)).  Nevertheless, this rule does not apply 
when there is some special relationship of confidence among the parties and 
because of such a relation a person is induced to relay on the others 
representations. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1954 cmt. (b) (2007). 
141.  Louisiana courts will, however, punish a person when their “failure to 
inform or to disclose [ ] is a flagrant abuse of the other party’s ignorance. 
Litvinoff, supra note 104, at 57.  However, if this abuse of ignorance is not 
present and the party merely remains silent, there is no duty imposed. Id. at 57-
58.  Professor Litvinoff points out: 
[R]eticence . . . does not occur in a void. Strange as it may seem, 
silence has a way of exteriorizing itself through the circumstances that 
surround it, circumstances that do not consist of an omission, such as 
silence, but are positive acts or facts.  It is in the light of such 
circumstances that silence may appear tainted with fraudulent intent 
and therefore becomes fraudulent reticence. Id.   
The professor provides the following example and commentary: 
Thus, if in the course of negotiations one party states his impression of 
the contractual object and asks from the other, “Tell me if I am wrong,” 
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The similar jurisprudential based rule that has emerged in the 
context of error is called “inexcusable error” and is consistent with 
the approach used in fraud.142  Basically, if the party in error did 
not take reasonable steps to prevent the mistake, the court will not 
save him.  While its application is not limited to situations where 
someone has failed to speak up when they know another party is 
operating under an error, it will act to prevent a court from 
imposing any duty of disclosure in those situations.  Thus, 
inexcusable error is an exception to Louisiana’s willingness to 
impose disclosure duties. 
The classic Louisiana example of inexcusable neglect is the 
case of Watson v. Planter’s Bank.143  In Watson, the plaintiff 
contracted with a bank to invest in cotton but did not read the 
contract to make sure it reflected his understanding of the terms.144 
Unsurprisingly, the contract he signed materially differed from the 
agreement he thought he had entered.145  The plaintiff filed an 
action in error, asking the court to rescind the agreement and the 
court refused.146 In rejecting his claim of error, the court stated, “In 
this case the plaintiff has no one but himself to blame for signing 
an agreement different from the one which he says he agreed to 
make.”147 
                                                                                                             
 
the other’s silence amounts to an assertion that the asking party is right, 
and will constitute fraudulent reticence if the one who remains silent 
knows that the other’s impression is false and resorts to silence to 
confirm that impression to this own advantage.  Courts should enjoy 
great discretion is deciding whether a party was under a duty to speak 
or to disclose information to the other, and it has been suggested that in 
reaching such conclusions the courts should not hold parties to a very 
high moral standard beyond what is necessary to see to it that honesty 
and decency prevail in legal transactions. Id.  
142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1952 cmt. (d) (2007) (citing 6 PLANIOL ET 
RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 227-229 (2d ed. Esmein 
1952)).  For a much more in-depth analysis of inexcusable error in Louisiana, 
see Saúl Litvinoff, “Error” in the Civil Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS 222, 226-269 (Dainow ed. 1969).  
143. 22 La. Ann 14 (La. 1870).  Watson is not a recent case.  In fact, the 
money used in the transaction was Confederate treasury notes.  Id.  
144. Id.  
145. Id.  
146. Id.  
147. Id.  
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Overall, Louisiana is not completely averse to using its rules of 
conventional obligations, specifically its rules on error and fraud, 
to impose duties of disclosure in certain circumstances.  It is true 
that Louisiana does not have a general duty of disclosure.  It is, 
also true, however, that a party remains silent at his own risk if he 
knows the other party is operating under an error.  In such 
situations, it is very possible that he will lose the right to recover 
damages if the contract is rescinded for error.  It is also likely that 
if his silence borders upon fraud, he may be found to have violated 
a duty of disclosure and thrown into fraud based liability. 
 
B. The Islamic Perspective 
 
The free consent and truthfulness of the parties to a contract is 
a moral obligation which underpins the law of Islam relating to 
contract.  Thus, the consent of the parties to a contract is a basic 
requirement of a valid contract that must be given voluntarily and 
free from the impediments of error, misrepresentation and fraud. If 
one of these impediments is present a contract is voidable because 
the full consent is barred.  Therefore, the enforceability of a 
contract is based on the integrity and genuineness of consent. 
Mistake (al-ghalat) is a cause of pollution of this genuineness and 
it is defined as “a state of mind that inspires an erroneous 
impression or unrealistic imagination.”148  Islamic doctrine divides 
the mistakes into two categories: hidden and apparent mistakes.  
The hidden mistake is a situation remaining in the mind of a party 
making him believe a different reality.  For example, the 
contracting party does not show his believed and erroneous ideas 
about the item he is buying.  The hidden mistake cannot invalidate 
the contract and the hidden impressions that are not revealed 
cannot be considered.  Also the apparent mistake regards a 
situation of imagination that exists in the mind of a contracting 
party but, in this case, it is expressly revealed (the purchaser stated 
that he wants to buy a ring made of gold instead he received a ring 
of brass).  Muslim jurists agree on the avoidance of the contract in 
this case.149 
The Islamic world does not have a definition of 
misrepresentation that can cover all species of misleading conduct 
                                                                                                             
148. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 240. 
 149. Id. at 241-242. 
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and statements; there is also a lack of systematic approach on the 
point.150  Misrepresentation is otherwise defined according the 
specific types.  It is generally defined as a false assertion of fact, 
either by word or conduct, or as the prevention of an existing 
defect in the subject-matter from being disclosed, which induces 
another to enter into a contract.151 
The traditional English classification of misrepresentation as 
innocent, negligent and fraudulent is not relevant for the Islamic 
world because here the effect of any misrepresentation is the same. 
In any case, the way in which the misrepresentation is made is 
more important than its effect.  So, the classification in Islam 
distinguishes between active fraud, false statements, and 
concealment of defects of the subject matter (which covers the 
contracts uberrimae fidei).152 
On the other side, the fact that a party has been induced to enter 
into a contract by the misrepresentation of the other contracting 
party is not enough to grant the remedy of rescission. Some other 
requirements must be fulfilled.  
                                                                                                             
150. A.A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 1 (3 ed. 1964) 
(1947) states:  
Islamic law is not a systematic code: but there is amongst its different 
schools a large measure of agreement, because the starting point and 
the basic principles are identical.  The differences that exist are due to 
historical, political, economic and cultural reasons, and it is, therefore, 
obvious that this system cannot be studied without a proper regard to its 
historical development. 
The impossibility to create a parallel between English and Islamic law 
derives from the different methods of approach.  Under English law, 
misrepresentation vitiates consent and so includes both acts and statements, in so 
far as they induce the state of mind of the parties to the contract and renders the 
apparent agreement unreal.  Islamic law, on the other hand, accepts the apparent 
agreement as valid but gives the injured party the option to rescind it.  See N.J. 
COULSON, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE GULF STATES: THE ISLAMIC LEGAL 
TRADITION 72 (1984).      
See generally J. SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 
(1959); A. HASAN, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 7 
(1970). 
151. In the traditional Shari’a, the authorities contain only several examples 
of fraud which gives the injured party the right to rescind the contract.   
BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 54. 
152. Id. at 57. 
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 First of all, the representation must be false. In general there is 
no duty to disclose any fact, except that of a known defect153 or, in 
the uberrimae fidei contract, all material fact.  If such a duty exists, 
anything that is less than a full disclosure amounts to a deliberate 
concealment and then the representation must be one of fact.  The 
statements of opinion, the advices, the laudatory or puffing 
statements or the ones made jokingly, are irrelevant except when 
the promisor says he will bear the responsibility of his promise.  A 
peculiar feature of the Islamic legal system is that all statements of 
law are considered as statements of fact on the basis that all the 
Muslims have a duty to know the law, given its holy origin.  
Again, what is needed is an inducement, i.e. the contracting party 
would have not entered into the contract without the 
misrepresentation; if, on the other hand, the deceived party 
discovers the misrepresentation and enters the contract regardless, 
he cannot invoke rescission but he may have relief under the 
option for defects if the thing is defective.154  Furthermore, the 
misrepresentation must be operative, i.e. an average man would 
have suffered a real misunderstanding.  The lack of diligence may 
bar the availability of the remedy (it is said that proof that the party 
was deceived must be shown in addition to the proof of the 
inducement).  Terein lies one of the main differences with the 
English system: while in common law the inducement is the 
decisive factor, in the Islamic legal system the accent is posed on 
the diligence of the deceived party in attempting to ascertain the 
truth of the fact (according to the standard of an average man).  In 
this sense, any loss due to this lack of diligence is not recoverable.  
Finally, we must consider the deceived party’s injury being 
compensated with damages.  In the uberrimae fidei contracts and 
                                                                                                             
153. Imam Malik clarified this point saying, “Who sells with an exemption 
clause exempting himself (the seller) from liability of any defects of the goods 
will be not responsible for that defect unless he knew about it and concealed it.  
If the seller knew and concealed the defect, such an exemption clause will not 
exempt him from the liability of such defective product.”  AL MUWATTA, supra 
note 71, no. 31.4 at 249.  
154. BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 166.  According to the Hanabali school, 
the intention to deceive is not taken into account in giving the right of rescission 
it is more important to measure the effect of the contract.  The contract can be 
rescinded if the representee can prove he suffered damages.   
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concealment of defect, the proof of the injury is not required.  In 
such cases the evidence of the existence of fraud is enough.155 
The idea of deception (Al-Ghabn) is defined as “a situation 
where one of the two considerations in commutative contracts is 
unequal in value to another during the construction of the 
contract.”156  
 Al-Ghabn is divided into two kinds: significant and 
insignificant.  These two kinds are defined in two different ways 
according to the schools.  The first interpretation defines the 
significant Ghabn as the kind that comes under the appraisal of the 
experts of the field.157  Another school of thought says that the 
Ghabn is significant if the thing sold is worthy more of the 5% of 
the price of purchase according to the appraisal of an expert.158  If 
the deception is insignificant the contract remains valid.  If the 
deception is significant we still have two lines of thoughts.  The 
majority of the jurists (Hanafi and Handbali schools) maintain that 
a significant Ghabn impairs the contract and causes an injury and, 
therefore, the deceived party has the right to rescind it.159  
 The Shafi’i school holds that a contract is validly formed and 
that commutative contracts upon which the Ghabn insisted are 
established and executed ab initio.  The granting to the deceived 
party of the right to rescind it will destabilize the commercial 
transactions.  Furthermore, the protection of the contracting parties 
from Ghabn is balanced with their duty to take care and precaution. 
Zubir said that the deceived party is liable for his failure because 
he acted inadvertently, therefore, he alone shall bear the 
consequences of his carelessness.160  In conclusion, contracts 
which are concluded with concealment of defects, false statements 
                                                                                                             
155. Id. at 85-93. 
156. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 246.  The example, that sounds strange to 
the ears of a western jurist, is the sale of a book for one hundred naira when its 
market value was of two hundred naira.  The vendor, in this case, is the deceived 
party.  On the other side, the buyer would be the deceived party if he buys for a 
higher price compared to the market value.  
157. Id. at 246-247. 
158. Id. at 247.  Specifying that not all the things sold are under the same 
percentage rule; the 10% for example is the rate required to be significant 
difference of price for the sale of animals. 
159. Id. at 248. 
160. Id. at 248-249. 
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when accompanied with lesio enormis, and active fraud are 
considered as voidable contracts.161  
If fraud (Al-taghrir), i.e. “the use of fraudulent means to induce 
a person to enter into a contract in which he has been made to 
believe that it will serve his interest but which in actual fact is 
detrimental,”162 is successful (i.e. without the fraud the party would 
never have concluded the contract) the victim of the trickery (Al-
Maghur) has a right to rescind the contract.163  The rescission is 
granted even if the Ghabn is insignificant.164 
As stated before, it is a general principle that the contracting 
parties are not obliged to disclose all the information about the 
bargain if the silence of the fact does not mislead the other 
contracting party.165  Precisely, silence is allowed on knowledge 
related to unimportant facts within the exclusive knowledge of the 
party, for instance the original price of the thing sold166  Disclosure 
(Katman) is, however, necessary when it is a prerequisite of the 
validity of the contract; the two main exceptions are the knowledge 
of defects and the contract uberrimae fidei.167  Under Islamic law 
reticence on facts is allowed only to the extent that it does not 
affect the article’s value or the purpose of the contract.168 For 
                                                                                                             
161. BAHARUM, supra note 65, at 133. 
162. ZUBAIR, supra note 49, at 252. 
163. Id. at 254. 
164. Id. at 255. 
165. In the small group of uberrimae fidei contracts in Islamic law (resale 
of goods for the exact price originally paid, or with an agreed profit, percentage 
or at an agreed discount) the original price paid is essential; so, the seller has the 
duty to disclose all the facts that affected the price.  COULSON, supra note 150, 
at 73. 
166. Therefore, the literal truth of the statements is not a defense if they 
convey a misleading idea upon the reader.  In brief, misleading statements or 
advertising depend on the category of person addressed.  These liability rules are 
the outcome of a religious system that has the aim of protecting moral values.  It 
is a subjectivity test the one applied to see if the person addressed has been 
mislead. Id.  
167. In English law the scope of the disclosure is less stringent according to 
the maxim of the caveat emptor.  Regard to the uberrimae fidei contracts, the 
differences with the common law lies only in some details.  
168. COULSON, supra note 150, at 72-73.  Where is narrated a peculiar case 
relates to the disclosure topic.  There is an offense called “meeting riders out of 
town.”  This regards the practice to intercept a caravan which had not reached its 
destination.  Due to the caravan ignorance of the local prices the tradesman 
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example, failing to disclose the color of a car is not a frustration of 
the purpose of the contract and it does not affect the car’s value.  
The disclosure of defects is required even if the other party 
would not have entered into the contract or the acquired knowledge 
would have lowered the price because the free consent is one of the 
prerequisite for the validity of the contract and the existence of 
defects prevents this state of mind.  This duty arises during the pre-
contractual stage.  Therefore, it is a tortious and non-contractual 
claim.  This reticence, regarded as fraud, renders the contract void.  
The defrauded party may rescind or affirm the contract for the full 
price.  This option (in the form of khiyar al’-aib or khiyar at tadlis, 
i.e. option for fraud) has the purpose to restore the defrauded party 
to the position he was in before the contract was made.  The 
Islamic concept of fraudulent misrepresentation also covers the 
deliberate silence of facts which the representor is obliged to 
discover, above all the defects on the thing sold.169     
 The duty to disclose is a moral one and it is not a prerequisite 
to invoke the option; the only thing that matters is the existence of 
the defect.170  The law of Allah was given to man and society must 
adapt itself to the law rather than creating new laws to changing 
needs.  
The products of the original agrarian society, normally 
uncomplicated and produced locally, were dealt with between 
                                                                                                             
 
could  elevate profits.  Such activity is condemned as cheating and the injured 
party can rescind the contract.  Id.  A similar case is analyzed by Cicero.  
In his work De Officiis, Cicero provides the example of a grain merchant 
who had imported a large cargo of grain to Rhodes during a period of severe 
famine.  Because of the famine, prices had risen to extremely high levels.  The 
merchant knew that there are other shipments of grain being sent to Rhodes, 
having passed them on his voyage.  Being an honest man, he is faced with the 
dilemma of disclosing the fact that other shipments of grain are coming, and 
selling his cargo at a lower price, or withholding the information, and selling his 
cargo at a greater profit.  Cicero, after analyzing both arguments, concludes that 
the information should be disclosed, for otherwise the merchant would be 
“shifty, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and 
subtlety.”  Cicero believed in a general duty of disclosure based in a sense of 
morality.  MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, 3 DE OFFICIIS sec. 12, at 319 (Walter 
Miller trans. 1913). 
169. COULSON, supra note 150, at 65.  
170. The defect is not limited, of course, on the value of the good.  If A 
buys a pair of shoes of a different size he cannot use them and the contract failed 
for the purpose even if the value is not lower of what was estimated.  
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sellers and buyers on a relative equal arms length.  Nowadays the 
products become every day more complex, produced far from the 
place of the sale and put in the market through adhesion contracts. 
This change in trade methods, sophistication of products, and the 
increasing amount of quantity and quality in the “things” sold 
creates a challenge for the Shari’a, which stopped developing at 
the tenth century.171  
From a national perspective, legal systems such as the 
Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, Mauritanian, Morocco and Algerian172 
have been receptive to both foreign and customary legal 
principles.173  These legal systems followed a movement of 
modernization that has occurred in most Islamic countries through 
the influence of European law and has gradually separated 
commercial law from the Shari'a.  This separation has occurred by 
application of two separate bodies of law referred to as “droit 
modern” and “droit musulman” (modern law and Islamic law). 
The “droit modern” is based on the French civil law codes and 
practices.174  It covers civil and commercial areas in general.  
Commercial law is the area where the European pattern is most 
prevalent because of the need to communicate with the rest of the 
world.  Commercial and financial transactions by their nature 
require flexibility, rapidity, and evolution, which probably cannot 
be met in the rigidity of some Islamic rules.  But Islamic precepts 
in any case require the observance of good faith and they include 
disclosure of defects relating to goods sold and also refraining 
from misrepresentation, concealment, and fraud in commercial 
transactions. 
The needs of evolution are mostly required in the transnational 
context.  But the Islamic law had the solution inside its own nature. 
Islamic laws governing business dealings substantially comply 
with transnational law notwithstanding the secular imprinting of 
                                                                                                             
171. N. J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 25 (1978).  See also 
CASTRO, supra note 19, at 13-14. 
172. Tunisia adopted a uniformed legal system abolishing the Islamic courts 
governing the law of personal status.  See J.N. Anderson, The Tunisian Law of 
Personal Status, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 262 (1958).  
173. See passim CASTRO, supra note 19. 
174. This is true above all for Algeria and Morocco.  See ZWEIGERT & 
KOTZ, supra note 20, at 338; and DAVID, supra note 11, at 391-396. 
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state laws.175  In particular, business law benefits from the Shari'a's 
power of adaptability that makes treaties like the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods176 fully 
compatible with Islamic law principles. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The classic Islamic legal tradition is now facing the advance of 
the western legal tradition. But there is a strong resistance.177  The 
scholars were able to implement the Islamic doctrine of religious 
duties in a complete legal system.  The fact these rules were 
formulated a long time ago and traced back, with some fictio, to 
the divine authority supported the opinion that they are immutable; 
they do not need governmental approval and they cannot be 
abrogated.178  
The Islamic principles are directed towards the creation of 
a fairer business market.  The same Qur’an affirms “o ye 
who believe! Eat not each other’s properties by wrongful 
means.”179 Khiyar al-‘aib rises a shield in defence of the 
buyer, ensuring a social welfare in the trade market.  The 
same Holy prophet put on the businessmen a sort of meta-
legal protection for the fair dealing transactions when is 
said that: [I]f both parties spoke the truth and describe the 
defects and quantities (of the goods) then they would be 
blessed in their transactions and if they told lies or 
                                                                                                             
175. F. Akaddaf, Application of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries. 
Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 
31-34 (2001).  See also DAVID, supra note 11, at 399.  
176. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) applies to international transactions involving the sale of goods 
and aims to promote international trade by removing legal barriers in 
transactions between international traders.  
177. See P.J. Riga, Islamic Law and Modernity: Conflict and Evolution, 36 
AM. J. JURIS. 103, 103-117 (1991); and D. Karl, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: 
What Foreign Attorneys Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. L. & ECON. 131 
(1992); see also Mallat, supra note 29, at 81-90.  
178. B. Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad, 26 AM 
J. COMP. L. 199, 210 (1978); B. Hallaq, Legal Reasoning in Islamic Law and the 
Common Law: Logic and Method, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 79 (1985). 
179. QUR’AN ch. 4:29.  
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concealed anything then the blessing of their transactions 
will be blotted out.180  
Khiyar al-‘aib and Caveat emptor share the aim of saving the 
business society and the trade market181 from the unfair dealings 
around defective products.182  They both have the task to ensure 
the quality of the goods.  
 The Islamic solution, once the goods have been scrutinized, 
focuses on the simplification of the transaction. When a person 
purchases a good with a defect, no matter if trivial or flagrant,183if 
it is not easily removable he may retain the object at its full price 
or reject it; but he cannot retain it and seek for compensation for 
the defect.184  Islamic commercial law implies the goods sold to be 
free from defects, Islamic courts may consider the silence of the 
seller fraudulent because Sharia seeks to assert the preclusion of 
unjustified enrichment.185  Then in any transaction “ there must be 
honest and free consent from both parties to ensure that they both 
enjoy maximum benefits from the transaction and that nobody 
                                                                                                             
180. It is a sort of precognition of the prisoner dilemma.  See also Al-
Bukhari, supra note 48, Volume 3, Book 34, Number 323: Narrated Hakim bin 
Hizam:  
The Prophet said: 
The buyer and the seller have the option of cancelling or confirming the 
bargain unless they separate, and if they spoke the truth and made clear 
the defects of the goods, them they would be blessed in their bargain, 
and if they told lies and hid some facts, their bargain would be deprived 
of Allah's blessings. 
181. G.M. Badr, A Survey of Islamic International Law, 76 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 56, 59 (1982). 
182. The first element is the centrality of trade, the universal respect it 
carries in Muslim civilization, and the importance of commerce as the nerve of 
the city and of regional or international exchange.  The free movement of goods 
is a key element in the intellectual structure of early Islam through to the present 
period.  The fact that the Prophet Muhammad started his career as a caravan 
merchant is unique to the Islamic Prophecy.  The original textual tradition of 
Islam and of Islamic law acknowledges the importance of commerce, including 
the security of long-distance trade and market sanctity, both on the ethical and 
the practical level.  Whatever the reality of emporia in the early Islamic Hijaz, 
the tradition of an Islamic Prophet-merchant is firmly received and developed 
across the centuries.  The contract of sale, since early Islam, is the measuring 
rod for all its “contractual sisters.”  See Mallat, supra note 29, at 93. 
183. BAILLIE, supra note 52, at 99.  
184. Id. at 98. 
185. RAYNER, supra note 69, at 229. 
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should suffer from any injustice or dishonesty.”186  Allah said to 
this effect, “. . . Eat not up your property among yourself in 
Vanities . . .”187  
 Maybe the western legal tradition and the Louisiana Civil Code 
of course are more rationality based while the Islamic tradition 
focuses more on supreme principles with a scent of natural law 
embodied in the ancestral times.  I am wondering, is it not the 
same way in which the common law started?  
The similarities between the above mentioned legal systems’ 
approach to caveat emptor and duties of disclosure are uncanny.  
Regardless of whether the issue is dealt with under the heading of 
mistake, misrepresentation, or error and fraud, there is a 
commonality of approach that cannot be missed.  And yet, despite 
this obvious diversity of methods, traditions and styles, it is 
possible to notice an element, or better, a tendency common to the 
examined regulations, that may be found, as usual, more in 
operational rules than in principle statements. 
Interestingly, caveat emptor is no longer the default rule in 
either Louisiana or Islam. And this is also true under most modern 
domestic rules, as well as under the CISG.  Today's international 
buyer is entitled to expect the goods to possess certain basic 
qualities, even if the contract does not expressly so state. Indeed, it 
would seem that caveat venditor has also become the 
supplementary CISG rule.188  
 
                                                                                                             
186. Billah, supra note 51, at 295. 
187. QUR’AN 4:29. 
188. E. Visser, Favor Emptoris: Does the CISG Favor the Buyer?, 67 
UMKC L. REV. 77 (1998). 
